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INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizational scholars have typically focused on events that are stable, routine, and predictable 
for theory development. This leaves the question of whether theories of organizations can be 
applicable to non-conventional events or crisis situations largely assumed and certainly not fully 
explored. Organizations sometimes do face major technologically based crises that can be highly 
costly. Crises faced by organizations often have their roots in both the external environment 
faced by the organization and in malfunctions within the organization (Perrow, 1984). While 
much of the previous research on organizational crisis has focused on avoidance, recent work on 
adaptive organizations suggests that design and expertise can work synergistically to effect 
performance, particularly in non-routine settings (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999).  
 
In this paper, we ask, given that a crisis has occurred, what organizational design fares best and 
whether the organization should change its design when a crisis occurs. We do so by building a 
computational model to examine 69 real crisis cases from a neo-information processing 
perspective (Carley & Gasser, 1999).  
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
That organizational performance is affected by design is highly documented (Baligh, Burton, & 
Obel, 1990; Scott, 1987). However, the relationship between performance during a crisis and 
design has received less attention. A crisis is a critical situation that can have severe negative 
consequences to the organization if not handled properly (Carley & Lin, 1995; Perrow, 1984). 
Studies have shown that crises can degrade organizational performance and that organizational 
design can be an important factor in mitigating the impact of the crisis (Carley & Harrald, 1997; 
Perrow 1984). However, there are few studies that compare organizational designs with an eye to 
performance across a wide number of crises and none that compares actual organizational 
behavior with a formal model.  
 
In this paper, we intend to extend the literature of organizational design by developing a neo-
information processing perspective (Carley & Gasser, 1999). We draw on work in contingency 
theory, information processing, cognitive science, and computer science. We characterize 
organizations as consisting of cognitively restricted, socially situated, and task oriented actors 
(Carley & Prietula, 1994). We are interested in explaining organizational performance. It is 
generally recognized that information processing and its relation to decision making are the 
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general indicator of organizational performance. Factors that influence accuracy, in this sense, 
influence performance under normal operating conditions and under stress, i.e., during periods of 
crisis. Organizational decisions result from the collective and integrative actions of all the actors 
as work, gather information, learn, communicate and make individual decisions in an interaction-
knowledge space. A wide variety of previous research has indicated that organizational 
performance is affected by a myriad of factors including, though probably not limited to: the 
training of the individuals in the organization, the lines of communication and command 
connecting these individuals (organizational authority structure and the degree of centralization), 
the resources and information to which the individuals have access, the nature of the task faced 
by these individuals, and the type and severity of stress under which these individuals operate.  
 
ARCHIVAL DATA 
 
Using archival sources including journal articles, books, and news media, information was 
collected on the organizational design characteristics, stress, and performance of 69 
organizations faced with technological disasters. These technological disasters create crisis 
situations to which the organizations must respond rapidly and accurately to mitigate adverse 
consequences. The organizations are drawn from 14 different industries. In each case, the 
organization was faced with a crisis, which had the potential to severely impact either human 
lives, the environment, or the local economy. We limit our attention to the period immediately 
surrounding the crisis.  
 
For each case we coded 31 variables related to task environment, organizational design, stress, 
and performance. A code book, describing each variable and how to code each variable was 
constructed. The coding was also validated through independent checking. 
 
The nature of the task environment was coded based on whether the components of the task 
faced by the organization can be processed independently (decomposability); and whether the 
distribution of tasks of different nature are clustered or dispersed (concentration).  
 
Aspects of organizational design were coded according to whether the organization's authority 
structure is based on hierarchy or team, whether the resource access structure is segregated or 
non-segregated, and whether the training is primarily operational or experiential.  
 
Causes of crises, or stress, were coded based on whether the sub-optimal operating condition was 
related to information uncertainty or agent malfunction. Information uncertainty occurs when 
one or more pieces of information needed to make operational decisions are incomplete or 
incorrect. Agent malfunction occurs when one or more members of the organization are not at 
their post, are unable to communicate, or are replaced by new personnel when they are needed to 
make decisions that related to the organizational operations.  
 
Organizational performance is coded for both the general situation and the crisis situation. For 
performance in the general situation, the frequency of prior similar crises, and the reputation of 
the organization in the local society were considered. For performance during crisis, both the 
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industry standard, and the actual impact of the crisis. 
 
CORP: THE SIMULATION MODEL 
 
This conceptual model is embodied in the simulation framework that we refer to as CORP 
(Computational ORganizational Performance framework) (Carley & Lin, 1995, 1997; Lin, 
2000). In this paper, we present a simplified description of CORP concentrating on those aspects 
that are relevant to this analysis. The CORP framework is a meso level multi-agent ACTS model 
(Carley & Prietula, 1994) in which each individual member of the organization is modeled as a 
cognitively restricted, socially situated, task oriented actor. The organization is modeled as in a 
distributed setting in which organizational decisions result from the collective and integrative 
actions of all the individuals in a holistic rather than simple additive fashion. Each organization 
is characterized by the lines of communication (organizational structure), who has access to what 
resources or information (resource access structure), and the training its personnel receive. Each 
organization operates in a particular task environment. Each organization operates under stresses 
such as sub-optimal operating conditions. Within CORP each of these items is a variable that can 
take on several different values.  
 
The computational modeling of task environment, organizational design, and stress follows the 
similar line as described in the archival data. Within CORP, however, organizational 
performance is measured in terms of average accuracy on a categorization/choice decision task. 
For the in general condition, we measure performance across all 19,683 possible events with 
nine attributes and three values under all levels of sub-optimalities (none, one, two, or three). For 
the during crisis condition we measure performance across just those events defined to be hostile 
and where there are one or more sub-optimalities. The percentage is then transformed into the 
similar level of performance (low, medium, or high) as coded for the archival data.  
 
COMPARISON PROCESS FOR MATCHED ANALYSIS 
 
We compare our theoretical model (embodied as a computational model) with "reality". The 
computational model serves as an encapsulation of organization theory and generates a series of 
predictions regarding how to design an organization that is faced with crisis so that it is effective. 
The "reality" is a set of data concerning the relative effectiveness of 69 actual organizations 
faced with actual crises.  
 
Given the 69 real cases we generate a matching set of 69 artificial organizations. We compare 
the relative performance of the real organizations and their artificial counterpart under both 
general and crisis conditions. This comparison provides a partial test of the model. Many of the 
real organizations restructure their design when faced with a crisis. We can use the model to ask 
the question, would the performance of these organizations have been higher or lower if they had 
not been restructured. In this way, we can begin to assess the relative value of restructuring 
organizational design in response to crisis.  
 
We find general agreement between model and reality. The Spearman correlation between the 
artificial and real organizations for general performance is 0.705 (p<0.000). This correlation 
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different organizational designs and stress is similar in the simulation framework and the real 
world. We now turn to a more detailed analysis. 
 
Designing for High performance 
 
We begin by asking whether the organizational design that exhibits highest performance during a 
crisis is also optimal under non-crisis conditions. We find that the optimal design for crisis may 
not be the optimal design in general.  
 
We further find that training, unlike the other elements of design, does have a consistent effect 
on performance. Specifically, experientially trained organizations will outperform operationally 
trained organizations both in general and during a crisis. This seems to be true in both the 
simulation and the real world.  
 
Another prediction derived from CORP is that for experientially trained organizations as more 
things go wrong (more sub-optimalities) organizational performance degrades. In the real world 
we observe that sub-optimalities similarly degrade performance for experientially trained 
organizations. However, we see a different pattern for operationally trained organizations in both 
the framework and the real world. In our 69 cases we do not observe this "U" shaped relationship 
between sub-optimalities and performance. This result should be viewed with caution as we have 
only two cases with three or more sub-optimalities.  
 
In the artificial organizations we observe that the impact of the sub-optimality on organizational 
performance depends on what it was that went wrong. Basically, if the error is attributable to 
agents, organizational performance is lower than if it is attributable to the quality of the 
incoming information. This is true whether the organizational members are trained to follow 
experience or standard operating procedures. We see this same pattern in the real data too.  
 
Dynamic Adaptation 
 
Finally, let us consider the role of organizational restructuring. We find, among the 69 real 
organizations that 38 out of 69 organizations altered either their organizational authority 
structure or their resource access structures or both when confronted with a crisis. These 
organizations switched their designs toward more complex designs. The number of 
restructurings in resource access structure is eight times as large as the number of restructurings 
in organizational authority structure. This suggests that organizations are more likely to maintain 
existent lines of communication and authority during crises but are more likely to restructure 
who has access to what and responsibility for what. Of all the 69 organizations, only 31 did not 
alter either their organizational authority or resource access structures.  
 
This data show that organizations faced with crises do increase their structural redundancy and 
move to more flexibility in accessing information and resources. However, it does not tell us 
whether this increase in redundancy has value. To answer this question we turn to a form of 
“what if” analysis. Using the framework we examine the performance of these organizations 
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hypothetical question: what if the organizations had not altered their design?  
 
The framework suggests that whether or not the organization should alter its design, given that a 
crisis has occurred, depends on whether the personnel are trained experientially or operationally. 
For experiential organizations, performance improves when crises occur whether or not the 
organization alters its design. For operational organizations performance degrades when crises 
occur whether or not the design is altered. As predicted by our model we observe performance 
improvements during crisis for experientially trained organizations and performance 
degradations for operationally trained organizations whether or not they restructured. Clearly, 
some organizational restructurings lead to higher performance (or less degradation) than do non-
restructurings.  
 
Using simulation we can move a step beyond this finding. The CORP simulation model predicts 
that for the experiential organization, the organization will see less of an improvement in 
performance due to crisis if it alters design. Thus, experiential organizations that actually do 
restructure theirs when faced with a crisis may mistakenly attribute the improvement in 
performance to the restructuring. In this case, experiential organizations that alter designs when 
faced with crises may mistakenly attribute the improvement in performance to the fact that they 
altered their design. When in fact, these same organizations might have experienced even greater 
gains in performance had they not restructured. In contrast, for the operational organization 
performance degrades when crises occur whether or not the organization alters its design. 
Further, for the operational organization, the organization will see less degradation in 
performance due to crisis if it does restructure. In this case, operational organizations who alter 
designs when faced with crisis may mistakenly interpret their degradation in performance as 
attributable, at least in part, to having altered their design. When in fact, these same 
organizations might have experienced even more performance degradation had they not 
restructured. Clearly these “what if” predictions cannot be tested with the particular real data we 
have used in this paper. However, the general fit between model and data suggests the 
plausibility of this analysis. Future work, perhaps in an experimental setting, might look at this 
issue in more detail. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study has examined the relationship between strategic design and performance for 
organizations under normal and crisis operating conditions. We took the stand that crises are 
essentially inevitable and asked how should organizations be designed to mitigate the effect of 
the crisis. We also examined whether the organization should alter its design when faced with a 
crisis. Our results indicate that, both in theory and in practice, performance is so conditional that 
the same design is rarely best for both non-crisis and crisis conditions. Further, organizations, 
depending on the training and decision making procedure, can benefit from restructuring when 
faced with crises. However, organizations may misinterpret the effect of altering their design. 
This study has strong implications for strategic management as it has demonstrated the impact of 
organizational design for strategic decision making but also specified the boundary conditions 
for critical environmental conditions.  
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world, and the overall experimental design. Despite these limitations, we believe this study has 
its significant contributions. First of all, this study examines both artificial and real 
organizations. Second, this study has viewed a crisis event as fundamentally an organizational 
issue and effectively demonstrated the benefit of adopting an organizational design approach to 
crisis management. Third, this study has implications beyond the field of crisis management. 
Fourth, this study has shown the effectiveness of computational modeling.  
 
We hope the approach used in this study and the results from this study can provide new 
directions for future research, both empirically, methodologically and theoretically, which can 
significantly expand our thinking and advance the field of organization science.  
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